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Abstract
This article examines Canada’s response to the Chilean 
refugee crisis in 1973. It explores the conditions that made 
the resettlement of Chilean refugees possible, despite the 
reluctance of the Canadian government to provide protec-
tion for them. The article focuses on the relation between 
the Canadian government’s regulatory discourses and 
practices on the one hand, and the Canadian public’s con-
testation of, and challenges to, such discourses and practi-
ces on the other.
The Chilean refugee crisis revealed that the Canadian 
refugee protection regime was subject to political ideology, 
with very little consideration given to the suffering of refu-
gees constructed as a threat to Canadian social, political, 
and economic well-being. However, civil society played a 
pivotal role in compelling the government to take a stance 
toward the refugees, though the government was able to 
control refugee reception by being deliberately selective 
about which lives it would save. The visibility and the 
success of the Canadian public in advocating on behalf 
of the Chilean refugees demonstrated the potential of this 
emerging civil power to affect refugee policies and practices 
while also revealing its limitations.
Résumé
Cet article examine la réponse du Canada à la crise des 
réfugiés chiliens de 1973. Il explore les conditions sous les-
quelles la réinstallation des réfugiés chiliens était rendue 
possible malgré la réticence de la part du gouvernement 
canadien à offrir une protection pour ces réfugiés. L’article 
se concentre en particulier sur le lien entre les discours et 
pratiques règlementaires du gouvernement canadien d’un 
côté, et de l’autre la contestation ainsi que l’opposition 
envers ces discours et pratiques de la part de la société 
civile canadienne. 
La crise des réfugiés chiliens avait démontré que le sys-
tème canadien de protection des réfugiés était sous l’emprise 
de l’idéologie politique, donnant très peu de considération 
à la souffrance humaine des réfugiés, qui étaient présentés 
comme une menace au bien-être social, politique et écono-
mique du Canada. Néanmoins, la société civile avait joué 
un rôle déterminant en incitant le gouvernement à adopter 
une position envers les réfugiés, bien que celui-ci avait pu 
maintenir son emprise sur l’accueil des réfugiés en sélec-
tionnant d’une façon délibérée lesquels il voulait sauver. La 
visibilité ainsi que le succès de la société civile canadienne 
dans son intervention en faveur des réfugiés chiliens avait 
mis en évidence le potentiel de cette force civile émergente, 
mais en même temps avait aussi souligné ses limitations. 
Introduction and Review of the Literature
On 11 September 1973, General Augusto Pinochet, supported by the American administration and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), led a suc-
cessful coup d’état against the democratically elected 
communist government of Salvador Allende in Chile. The 
first few months following the coup were the most critical, 
because Pinochet’s military and security forces used the 
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most lethal forms of violence in order to eliminate “the 
cancerous tumor” of opposition.1 Thousands were killed or 
tortured by virtue of their political affiliation with Allende.
With Amnesty International’s revelation of these atroci-
ties to the international community in late 1973, Pinochet’s 
governing style was put under scrutiny, leading him to 
adopt a more calculated and controlled display of violence. 
While there is no credible figure on the number of civilians 
killed during this period, Amnesty International estimated 
that between 11 September and the end of December 1973, 
5,000 to 30,000 people lost their lives in detention centres, 
or were simply killed in the open streets.
Chileans and other nationals whose lives were in 
immediate danger sought sanctuary in foreign embassies in 
Santiago, since they were considered safer than the camps 
established by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR).2 Unlike the many embassies in Santiago 
that granted diplomatic asylum to refugees, the Canadian 
embassy was very selective and reluctant to allow people in. 
This response reflected the Canadian government’s general 
attitude toward the Chilean refugees, which was character-
ized by apprehension and suspicion.
With the exception of providing protection to fifty young 
and educated individuals in its embassy, the Canadian gov-
ernment avoided any meaningful action to save the lives of 
people in danger in the first four months following the coup. 
The unique treatment of Chilean refugees brings to the fore 
the contradictions inherent in Canada’s perceived humani-
tarian tradition of refugee protection, especially considering 
the swift Canadian response to the Ugandan-Asian refugee 
crisis the year before. In less than three months after the 
expulsion order imposed by Amin in August 1972, the Can-
adian government resettled more than 6,000 Asians.
Studies have examined the Canadian response to the 
Chilean refugees. For instance, Dirks (1979), Troper (1993), 
and Whitaker (1987) contend that anti-communist ideology 
(informed by Canada’s economic interests) was the driv-
ing force behind the delays and rejections of many of the 
applications submitted by Chileans for resettlement.3 Dug-
gan (1994), Knowles (2007), and Simmons (1993) assert that 
the government’s decision to intervene in the Chilean crisis 
was due to a defiant public that challenged the resettlement 
scheme.4 These studies provide useful information on the 
factors influencing the Canadian government’s approach in 
Chile. However, historical accounts tend to over-simplify 
the complexity of this response, or provide very little 
insight into how government policies and practices were 
implemented to achieve its goal in limiting the number of 
Chileans entering Canada.
The only work written in English that pays close atten-
tion to, and offers a comprehensive examination of, the 
response of the Canadian government in Chile is Francis 
Peddie’s Young, Well-Educated, and Adaptable, published 
late last year. Peddie presents a more complex and multi-
layered analysis of Canada’s response.5 He points to the mul-
tiple forces at work that influenced it, including Canada’s 
economic and national interests, relations with the United 
States, the Canadian ambassador’s attitudes toward Allende 
and Pinochet, and the instrumental role played by Canadian 
civil society, especially church groups. Ultimately, Peddie 
asserts that the reaction of the Canadian government was 
“shaped [more] by ideological concerns and economic pre-
rogatives,” and less by ostensible humanitarian concerns.6
Peddie presents a full account of the different forces that 
affected the Canadian government’s response, and thus pro-
vides a pivotal contribution to this area of study. Unfortu-
nately, he provides very little analysis of how these different 
forces came together to control the entry of Chilean refugees 
to Canada. This deficiency might be due to the fact that his 
study, as he points out, is less concerned with “state actors 
and structural factors” than with how Chileans dealt with 
“the issues of admission and settlement.”7 Peddie also places 
too much emphasis on Canada’s relation with the United 
States as a determining factor of its response.
My research, which involved reading thousands of docu-
ments and exchanges between government officials, has 
found very little evidence to support this claim. Canadian 
government officials formulated and rationalized their 
response to the refugee crisis in Chile on many occasions, 
but relations between Canada and the United States did 
not appear to play any significant role. Similarly, Canada’s 
decision to recognize the junta, which arguably had far-
reaching implications, paid very little attention to Canada-
U.S. relations. Once the safety of Canadians in Chile was 
established, the decision to recognize the junta was based 
mainly on Canada’s economic interests, while taking into 
account decisions made by other countries, especially in 
the Commonwealth and Latin America. This was clearly 
demonstrated in a memorandum to the minister of external 
affairs and the prime minister in late September 1973:
Re-establishing de jure diplomatic relations with Chile would 
evidently prove most helpful in negotiating, probably multilat-
erally and at the higher official level, a solution to this pressing 
matter. From a commercial point of view, recognition is becom-
ing an urgent requirement. Before the coup, the EDC had insured 
the sale of six Twin Otters to the Chilean national airline LAN. 
These airplanes are now being assembled and a contract is to be 
signed with LAN. ITAC has informed us that the Chileans badly 
need these airplanes and will arrange for the signature of the 
contract immediately following the recognition … Further with-
holding recognition … could well start complicating our bilateral 
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relations. The two basic conditions for extending recognition have 
been fulfilled: as already mentioned the Junta firmly controls the 
national territory and it has pledged that it will honour Chile’s 
international obligations which includes the debt to the members 
of the Paris Club. The military can also claim that their regime is 
enjoying reasonable support from large, moderate sectors of the 
population as the only alternative to chaos. Up to this date some 
35 countries have recognized the Junta.8
The absence of any American influence is not surpris-
ing. Unlike his predecessors, Trudeau believed that Canada 
needed to focus less on pursuing ideological alliances with 
the United States, and more on developing its international 
economic interests.9 This move coincided with the relative 
decline of U.S. hegemony in some parts of the world, as well 
as Trudeau’s uneasy relationship with the U.S. administra-
tion during Nixon’s term in office.10 Between 1968 and 1976, 
Canada showed leadership and independence on the world 
stage by seeking closer economic ties with countries in the 
Commonwealth, Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, and 
the Caribbean, including communist countries, while distan-
cing itself from the United States and its ideological policies.
Focusing on the first four months of the crisis, the study 
is concerned both with the forces and relations of power 
that made it possible for the Canadian government to inter-
vene and resettle Chileans, and with how these forces and 
relations were applied and assembled through legislation, 
policies, institutions, discourses, and other practices to cre-
ate certain effects.
The first part discusses my theoretical and methodo-
logical approach, which relies on the work of Michel Fou-
cault, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari on assemblage/
apparatus, as well as on Tania Li’s analysis of practices of 
assemblage. The second part applies the practices proposed 
by Li to examine how the Canadian government assembled 
its response to the Chilean refugee crisis. The article con-
cludes with a summary of its main contributions and poten-
tial future work in the area.
The article argues that “cultural racism,” along with 
coveted trade agreements and the desire to halt communist 
and Quebec separatist contamination—in short, Canada’s 
political and economic interests—initially overshadowed 
the human suffering inflicted by the Pinochet regime. Cul-
tural racism, as Balibar points out, is employed to exclude 
cultures that do not possess Western liberal values, such as 
“‘individual’ enterprise, social and political individualism.”11
In a context of growing public protests, the Canadian 
government had to seriously commit to an action plan for 
resettlement. It justified this intervention on the grounds 
of security and humanitarian concerns. As a result of the 
screening processes of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP), which sought to exclude individuals with commun-
ist or Quebec separatist leanings, and health and immi-
gration officials who implemented Canada’s point system, 
a well-educated, young, and highly desirable immigrant 
group of Chileans was selected.12 That being said, Canada’s 
assembled response was not straightforward, as it reflected 
contradictions and tensions between the stakeholders 
involved.
Theoretical Perspective and Methodology
In his influential Confession of the Flesh, Foucault elaborates 
on the concept of dispositive/apparatus, noting that it refers 
to the system of relations (of power) established between 
“a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of dis-
courses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory deci-
sions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in 
short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements 
of the Apparatus.”13 Through these complex relations of 
power (whether repressive and negative, or positive and 
productive), the apparatus shapes conduct.
Foucault adds that the apparatus involves different con-
nections and reconfigurations between heterogeneous ele-
ments. “[A] particular discourse can figure at one time as 
the programme of an institution,” Foucault notes, “and at 
another it can function as a means of justifying or mask-
ing a practice which itself remains silent, or as a second-
ary re-interpretation of this practice, opening out for it a 
new field of rationality.”14 It is an assemblage of different 
ways in which power is practised: “a formation which had 
as its major function at a given historical moment that of 
responding to an urgent need … [that] has a dominant stra-
tegic function.”15
Deleuze and Guattari build on Foucault’s work by introdu-
cing the concept of assemblage, agencement, which denotes 
“a contingent ensemble of diverse practices and things that is 
divided along the axes of territoriality and deterritorialisa-
tion. Furthermore, particular alignments of technical and 
administrative practices extract and give intelligibility to 
new spaces by decoding and encoding milieus. In short, 
particular assemblages of technology and politics not only 
create their spaces, but also give diverse values to the prac-
tices and actors thus connected to each other.” Deleuze and 
Guattari call any multiplicity of interconnected techniques 
and actors “a continuous self-vibrating” plateau.16
Assemblage is concerned with rhizomatic expansion as 
well as disaggregated and heterogeneous elements.17 Slater 
argues that assemblage has the same effect as apparatus, but 
without Foucault’s preoccupation with the notion of order.18
The concepts of assemblage have been utilized in studies 
to explore a whole range of issues. Slater, and Haggerty and 
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Ericson employ the terms mobility assemblage and surveil-
lant assemblage respectively to explore issues of surveillance. 
Haggerty and Ericson argue that the surveillant assemblage 
ultimately aims to achieve certain finalities, whether eco-
nomic profit, social control, and/or managing behaviour.19 
Yet Slater insists that the surveillance and management of 
circulation is not driven by “an internal logic,” but rather 
expands “to fit the space available.”20 The inconsistency in 
these bodies of work on assemblage relates to the philosoph-
ical tradition underlying the work. Whereas Haggerty and 
Ericson seem to adopt it in relation to Foucault’s concept of 
apparatus, Slater applies a strict Deleuzian reading.
With that said, Legg argues that it is possible to bring 
these two terms together. While he acknowledges that 
Deleuze uses the term to highlight dis-order, he argues that 
he “also portrayed assemblages as leading to order, striation, 
re-territorialisation, long-term effects and scaling as much 
as to dis-order, smoothing, de-territorialisation, short-term 
effects and de-scaling.”21 In this study, I follow Legg’s prop-
osition of a shared understanding of apparatus/assemblage. 
I rely on Tania Li’s methodological and theoretical frame-
work adopted in her Practices of Assemblage and Commun-
ity Forest Management, where she operationalizes the use 
of assemblage. She identifies six practices that are generic 
in any assemblage—forging alignments, rendering technol-
ogy, authorizing knowledge, managing failures, engaging 
in anti-politics, and reassembling—thus blurring the philo-
sophical difference between apparatus and assemblage. I 
loosely employ these generic attributes to shed light on “the 
way in which heterogeneous elements including ‘discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions’ are assembled to address an 
‘urgent need’ and invested with strategic purpose.”22
The appeal of the concept of assemblage, as applied by Li, 
lies in its practical yet complex analytical contribution. It 
problematizes the Canadian government’s response to the 
Chilean refugee crisis by highlighting connections, contest-
ations, and tensions between the stakeholders who forged 
the refugee resettlement, including state actors, Canadian 
civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
Chilean refugees. It provides insight into how the Chilean 
refugees and their resettlement were problematized—that is, 
diagnosed, framed, and disrupted in response to seen and 
unforeseen circumstances. Finally, it places government 
intervention (or the lack of it) within a political, economic, 
historical, and social context that produced “the actual and 
the possible.”23 It draws attention to how different forces 
came together at a particular conjuncture “only to disperse 
or realign.”24 Drawing on Li’s proposed practices, I will 
consider the unique integration of the forces and relations 
of power at particular conjunctures in order to reveal the 
conditions that made the resettlement of the Chilean refu-
gees possible.
In her Along the Archival Grain, Stoler maintains that 
engaging with the “archive as subject” rather than “source” 
opens up new avenues for analyzing the past where facts are 
produced by states in order to contain the reality of gov-
ernance.25 My research project, which relies for the most 
part on archival material, examines the contradictions and 
silences in “factual” narratives, examining the conditions 
of production.
I accessed archival records on Chile at Library and 
Archives Canada (LAC), the Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada Library, and Carleton University library. The rec-
ords, which date from the late 1970s to early 1975, include 
letters, memorandums, and reports written by the Can-
adian ambassador in Santiago, ministers and their dep-
uties, the prime minister, the Cabinet, and the bureaucracy 
relating to the crisis in Chile. Further, I surveyed reports 
written by human rights and advocacy groups, including 
church groups, university professors, unions, and other 
ordinary Canadians appealing for the resettlement of the 
Chilean refugees. I also scanned news articles and editorials 
appearing in Canadian media outlets and used secondary 
sources on the Chilean refugee crisis.
In reading these documents, I focused on how and why 
Chilean refugees were securitized and/or humanized. I 
paid particular attention to the ways different domestic and 
global forces and events, such as the Cold War, American 
policy in Latin America, U.S.-Canada relations, the Que-
bec Crisis, the rise of civil rights movements in Canada and 
the United States, and Canada’s previous response to refu-
gee crises abroad might have shaped this response. I also 
attended to how this response was implemented and pre-
sented publicly and privately; that is, what the government 
said, how it acted, and what rules it imposed in response to 
this refugee crisis. The data were analyzed by applying Li’s 
practices of assemblage.
Discussion: Assembling the Government Response 
to the Chilean Refugee Crisis
The response of the Canadian government to the Chilean 
refugee crisis is an assemblage that emerged out of the 
struggle between actors to achieve their objectives at a 
particular conjuncture. These actors included govern-
ment officials, such as the Canadian ambassador in Chile, 
the minister of immigration and the minister of foreign 
affairs and other advisors from the department, the RCMP, 
Immigration and Health and Foreign Affairs, the UNHCR, 
the New Democratic Party (NDP), Canadian churches, and 
other civil society groups. Each actor aspired to maintain 
or increase its power over Canada’s economic and political 
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interests in Chile, preserving Canadian unity, ensuring the 
safety and security of Canadians domestically and abroad, 
controlling entry to Canada by selecting immigrants who 
would contribute to its political economy, and resettling 
Chileans in need of protection.
This response was ultimately a struggle between author-
ities’ will to preserve the security apparatus and their desire 
to manage the aspirations of (free) citizens to uphold Can-
ada’s humanitarian tradition. Drawing on the practices 
identified by Li, the following four sections map out and 
analyze how these elements were brought together, high-
lighting moments of fracture, contradiction, and failure.
Forging Alignments
Forging alignments, according to Li, refers to the ways in 
which certain links are assembled to meet the objectives 
of those “who aspire to govern conduct” and “those whose 
conduct is to be conducted.”26 For Rose, these links are 
essential to the logic of liberal government, because they 
simultaneously reinforce the “autonomy of certain ‘pri-
vate’ zones” and shape the conduct and “aspirations of free 
[autonomous] citizens.” The autonomy of citizens, Rose 
points out, needs to “be allied with, and aligned with, such 
objectives as economic success, national population policy, 
conceptions of desirability of education and training and 
the like.”27 That said, the work of forging alignments is also 
fragile, because it requires the negotiation of conflicting 
demands and interests.28
Forging alignments between actors in this assemblage 
was not straightforward, as it underlined different aspira-
tions, values, and interests. Upon winning the federal elec-
tion in 1968, Pierre Elliot Trudeau clarified that promoting 
national unity and Canadian economic interests abroad 
were his priorities.29 Domestically, Trudeau was concerned 
with Quebec’s bid for independence, and with the growing 
prominence of the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), 
which he saw as a terrorist group in part because of its 
involvement in the kidnapping of the British trade com-
missioner and the Quebec minister of labour in October 
1970. It was claimed that the FLQ had been trained by anti-
imperialist movements in Latin America, whose “terrorist” 
tactics it had ostensibly used.30
To deal with the challenge of the FLQ, the government 
entrusted the RCMP with monitoring and controlling the 
activities of Quebeckers domestically and abroad. The RCMP 
also worked closely with Canadian immigration officials 
abroad to ensure the selection of individuals who contributed 
to Canada’s Western liberal democratic values and the exclu-
sion of others who were perceived as threatening those values.
Meanwhile, Quebec had well-established ties to Latin 
America. These ties were largely due to surplus Catholic 
priests who left during the Quiet Revolution for the pre-
dominately Catholic Latin America, which was experien-
cing a shortage of priests. Quebec perceived the presence 
of these priests as “a reinforcement of its ‘special status’ as 
a ‘Latin’ region of North America,” and as “projecting the 
French reality in the Americas.”31 Further, the Comité de 
Solidarité Québec-Chili, which was established shortly after 
the coup, made an immediate connection between the 
struggle of Quebeckers and the Chilean people: “In Qué-
bec, we had the War Measures Act and Bill 19, followed by 
the imprisonment of union leaders. Our ‘democracy’ cites 
national security and essential services as its justification; 
the military junta invokes security and national recon-
struction.”32 This connection, along with the religious and 
cultural association with Chile, was the basis for the “quick 
mobilization in Québec.”33
While this connection forged an alignment between 
Quebec and refugees from Chile, it also presented fracture 
lines. It threatened the Canadian government’s aspiration 
to control Quebec’s independence, and to allow the entry 
of individuals who were perceived as unfit for its Western 
liberal values. The alignment of Chilean refugees in need of 
protection and the Canadian government was further com-
pounded by Canada’s economic interests. These interests 
were managed by Mitchell Sharp, the minister of external 
affairs, who “emerged as a business-like manager of Can-
adian foreign policy.”34 Sharp conceived relations between 
Latin America and Canada as centred solely on economic 
interests and ensured that diplomatic postings abroad 
reflected this priority.35
As Chileans and other nationals were fleeing Pinochet’s 
violence and persecution, the Canadian government was 
negotiating trade and debt-reduction agreements with 
Pinochet. Once Pinochet seized power, imports from and 
exports to Chile increased substantially. In fact, the Can-
adian Export Development Corporation Department even 
sold Pinochet military equipment, including de Havilland 
aircraft, for $5 million.36 Canada also endorsed the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) in granting the Chil-
ean government loans totalling $100 million, when Nordic 
countries refused to approve similar loans.37
Canadian economic interests in Chile were preserved 
and coordinated by the Canadian ambassador to Chile, 
Andrew Ross, who later emerged in the eyes of the Can-
adian public as the architect of the government’s decision 
not to immediately intervene in protecting Chileans, and 
hence as an unsympathetic figure. Ross’s dislike of Allende 
and his supporters, and his unequivocal support of Pino-
chet, was clearly articulated in his letters to the office of 
External Affairs in Ottawa. These exchanges revealed that 
the Canadian government was less concerned with the fate 
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of Chileans, and more with the economic interests that 
might be capitalized on by Chile’s change of government.38 
Ross expressed his resistance to any resettlement initiative 
due to the Chilean refugees’ “culture,” and its implications 
for Canadian commercial relations with Chile. “It would be 
most unwise to officially deliver homilies on [the] virtues of 
democracy as we practice it under entirely different condi-
tions … [and] counter-productive in terms of our political 
and commercial relations with Chile,” he wrote in a Telex to 
External Affairs.39
That said, the ambassador delivered what the government 
wanted to hear. Ross was diligent in briefing the minister’s 
office on the situation in Chile, including his intention to 
prevent people from entering the embassy.40 With the 
encouragement of the Ministry of External Affairs, Ross 
sought to secure Canadian interests, which incidentally 
involved closing the door on people in immediate need of 
protection.
The conditions that made it possible for Canada to main-
tain its economic interests in Chile, and to exclude Chileans 
from protection, were slowly being fractured, allowing more 
space for public discontent. Indefatigable priests and bishops 
who witnessed first-hand the atrocities committed by Pino-
chet during their service in Chile contested the narrative of 
the government. Upon returning to Canada, they exposed 
these atrocities, along with the Canadian government’s atti-
tudes toward Pinochet, to the broader Canadian public.41 
These clergymen, whose churches had been involved in 
government resettlement schemes since the Second World 
War, also put intense pressure on the government to resettle 
Chileans. The testimonies of these clergymen were echoed 
and supported by Amnesty International’s report published 
in December 1973, which exposed state repression, torture, 
and human rights violations.
Other segments of Canadian society, including unions, 
university professors and students, and human rights 
groups rallied behind church groups, thus forging a 
stronger alignment with the Chilean refugees.42 This 
organic mobilization was due not only to the intervention 
of church groups, but also to the socio-political environ-
ment in which the Chilean crisis occurred. Between the late 
1960s and early 1970s, anti-American sentiments were rising 
among Canadians who disapproved of the Vietnam War, 
anti-communist ideology, and U.S. imperialist policy in 
Latin America. Mainstream civil society groups, including 
academics and church groups, contested the designation of 
certain groups who resisted colonial and imperial powers as 
terrorists, when other European refugees from communist 
regimes were perceived as freedom fighters.
The NDP, which held the balance of power in the min-
ority Liberal government, was also very critical of the 
government’s response to the crisis in Chile. It was vocally 
opposed to the recognition of the junta. It also urged the 
government to recognize diplomatic asylum and expedite 
the resettlement of Chileans. Most notably, the NDP leaked 
confidential cables, written by the Canadian ambassador in 
Chile to the Department of External Affairs, to the media. 
In these cables Ross described the Chileans as “riff raff” and 
noted that Pinochet brought an end to the “political mad-
ness” of the Allende government.43
The leaks seriously damaged the government’s credibility 
on the issue of the Chilean refugees, exposing official indif-
ference to human suffering. The minister of external affairs 
did not explicitly defend his ambassador’s actions, which 
inadvertently implied that the ambassador acted alone. The 
government’s decision to finally intervene aimed to address 
its failure to properly manage knowledge and accurately 
assess the growing role of civil society in refugee protection 
issues.
Managing Failures and Contradictions: Framing 
the Arena of Intervention
Li addresses managing failures to the “outcome of rectifi-
able deficiencies” and the means through which comprom-
ises are devised. Contradictions in this case are viewed as 
“superficial,” but not “fundamental.” Framing is particularly 
important in managing “the unruly array of forces and 
relations,” and in producing an intervention with “optimal 
arrangements.” The technical solutions authorized by the 
government to deal with failures “present simplified narra-
tives of problem/solution that gloss over tensions to make 
the assemblage appear far more coherent than it is.”44
Despite the appeal of Canadian church groups in the 
first few weeks of the crisis, government authorities limited 
the number of refugees entering the embassy and publicly 
downplayed the crisis in Chile. Based on instructions from 
External Affairs, the ambassador in Chile applied a nar-
row interpretation of protection. Individuals were allowed 
entry into the embassy if they proved that their lives were 
in immediate and imminent danger.45 The government was 
also careful in the ways it framed the refugee crisis in Chile 
to the public. A memorandum written to the minister of 
external affairs on 12 October 1973 suggested that the min-
ister should refrain from using the term refugee or refuge, 
further explaining,
It has become evident that the use of the term “refugee” may 
cause problems because of the potential abuse by persons seek-
ing admission to Canada of claims to refugee status … It would 
be most desirable in statement or in response to questions in 
the House, therefore, to avoid use of the word “refugee” entirely 
when referring to the Chilean situation or to the fifteen who have 
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come forward to Canada. “Persons affected by the coupe,” “those 
who took shelter,” or some such phrase, would be an acceptable 
alternative. It might also be helpful to refer to “shelter” rather than 
“refuge.”46
With growing public pressure and the exposure of the 
diplomatic cables, the Canadian government had very little 
choice but to reveal an action plan. To deal with this crisis 
of confidence, the government deployed a senior official 
from External Affairs, and another from the Department of 
Manpower and Immigration, on 19 November 1973 to Chile 
and neighbouring countries to assess the needs of refugees. 
In reporting back to the government, the officials pointed 
out that the fear of death and detention was still high. They 
advised the government to adopt a humanitarian approach 
to meet the needs of vulnerable individuals. This approach, 
they pointed out, needed to take into account public expect-
ations in light of Canada’s humanitarian tradition, the risks 
and inconveniences that refugees might pose to Canadians 
and Canada’s interests, and implications for immigration 
policy.47
Stevenson notes that the report was “crucial in forging a 
new program to bring Chileans to Canada.”48 By adopting 
this program, the government opted to revise its attitudes 
to meet new conditions of formation that took into account 
the desires and aspirations of civil society. Nonetheless, the 
government imposed new technologies of control through 
rigid screening, which was presented as essential in elim-
inating threats to Canadians and their democratic institu-
tions. That said, selection became the “site of contestation” 
among stakeholders.
The first special measure adopted by the government 
targeted the resettlement of 300 to 1,000 refugees and 
“oppressed persons,” both Chilean and non-Chilean, inside 
and outside of Chile, by February 1974. The second offered 
a special protection operation to be completed by 2 January 
1974 for a single group of fifty Chileans who were at risk of 
harm or long-term detention, and were not registered with 
the UNHCR. This humanitarian intervention, noted Andras, 
aimed to “meet genuine feeling and deep humanitarian con-
cern which continue to be conveyed … by many Canadians 
and in particular church leaders.” He also pointed out that 
the provisions adopted toward the Chilean refugees would 
be “comparable to those applied to the past movements to 
Canada.”49
Unlike the Ugandan-Asian resettlement the previous 
year, which involved no security screenings, the instruc-
tions from the minister’s office insisted that Chileans and 
other nationals considered for resettlement undergo strict 
security screenings to exclude “known terrorists and 
persons with serious non-political criminal records.”50 
“Chilean refugees seeking landed immigrant status in Can-
ada,” added the minister in a telephone interview with the 
Toronto Star on 3 December 1973, “will be refused admission 
if their political beliefs lead to violence.”51
The framing of the Chilean refugees as endangering the 
well-being of Canadians and their institutions was essential 
in justifying exclusionary practices. In a letter to the prime 
minister justifying the rigid security screening, Andras 
emphasized his responsibility to protect Canadians: “The 
decision to admit people to our embassy would not be an 
immigration decision but any problems that subsequently 
result would certainly become my responsibility … [P]art 
of that responsibility is the protection of residents of Can-
ada from the admission of persons who represent serious 
threats to security and order.”52
Andras also reiterated the public danger posed by Chil-
eans: “[There will be] hell to pay in this country [over the 
decision to admit Chileans to Canada],” he declared. “Yes, 
there are Marxists among them, I suppose … We think 
we’ve screened out anybody who really wants to import vio-
lent overthrow of the Canadian government.”53
The framing of the Chileans as dangerous justified the 
formulation and adoption of rigid security and immigra-
tion screenings. Thus once the Canadian ambassador was 
no longer credible in the public eye, the power to decide 
matters of life and death was handed over to the minister 
of immigration, the RCMP, and immigration and health 
officials. The legislation implemented by the minister of 
immigration, which was framed in terms of humanitarian 
concern with suffering and loss of life, aimed, along with 
immigration and health officials’ screening processes, to 
select refugees who demonstrated an ability to integrate 
into Canadian society and the labour market, and not to 
burden Canada’s welfare system or endanger public health. 
The Chilean refugee crisis became a technical, “anti-polit-
ical” issue subject to immigration and security screenings.
Anti-Political Practices and Authorized Knowledge
I use the term anti-political in Li’s sense. She uses it to refer 
to the ways in which political questions become a matter 
of technique when dismissing or limiting debate on “how 
and what to govern and the distributive effects of particu-
lar arrangements by reference to expertise.” The govern-
ment’s assembled humanitarian response, which involved 
the discretionary power of the minister along with a series 
of legislative and other practices, was presented as having 
the neutral objective of remedying human suffering. The 
screening processes of immigration and health officials, 
and the RCMP, were treated as a technical means to achieve 
this humanitarian goal while protecting the safety and 
security of Canadians. The success of this assemblage was 
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determined by the authorization of knowledge, which for Li 
refers to “specifying the requisite body of knowledge; con-
firming enabling assumptions; containing critique.”54
Institutions are carriers of ideas and collective mem-
ories.55 These ideas and memories are essential in under-
standing RCMP activity in Chile. In 1946, Canada’s prime 
minister, Mackenzie King, created the RCMP with the sole 
mission of preventing communist infiltration into Can-
ada.56 By the early 1970s the RCMP was also charged with 
closely monitoring FLQ activities. The RCMP enjoyed great 
discretionary power and autonomy, and operated with con-
siderable secrecy and scant accountability to the public. It 
was only in the early 1980s, following the publication of the 
McDonald report, which investigated the RCMP’s alleged 
involvement in illegal activities in Canada, that the RCMP’s 
power was scrutinized.
While RCMP activities in Canada were exposed and even-
tually scrutinized, the extent of its activities abroad, which 
largely affected refugees, was never explored. Where refu-
gees were concerned, the RCMP had full power over life. “For 
all intents and purposes,” Agamben notes, “the normal rule 
of law is suspended and … the fact that atrocities may or 
may not be committed does not depend on law but rather on 
the civility and ethical sense of the police that act temporar-
ily as sovereign.”57
The RCMP was in full command of the security screen-
ings of Chileans. It based its decisions on information from 
foreign intelligence, including the CIA, which incidentally 
assisted Pinochet in toppling the Allende regime.58 From 
the RCMP’s perspective, the Chilean refugees were exactly 
the kind of immigrants that Canada needed to avoid. They 
were the most dangerous, as they represented the combined 
threat of communism and Quebec separatism. They were 
also associated with and supported by unions, academics, 
students, and progressive church groups in Quebec—the 
same groups that the RCMP had been monitoring in Canada 
out of fear of communist or FLQ infiltration. Given the mis-
sion and history of the RCMP, it is not surprising that the 
security screenings of the RCMP were the primary reason 
for the delays in processing the applications of the Chilean 
refugees, and the high rate of rejection. Among the 2,321 
applications received by 4 January 1974, only 109 persons 
received immigration visas.59
Despite the relaxed immigration criteria, Chileans still 
needed to demonstrate their ability to integrate into Can-
adian society in accordance with Canada’s point system. 
The point system was adopted in 1967 to deal with the 
growing need for technical and industrial economies, and 
to officially eliminate previous racist rules that gave prefer-
ence to European immigrants. This system, which remains 
the primary instrument for immigrant selection, decided 
immigrant selection on the basis of family ties, language 
acquisition, job skills, and education. Individuals were 
awarded a maximum number of points in each category. 
The system, which was adopted in the name of liberalism, 
justice, diversity, and equal opportunity, along with the 
administrative measures dealing with immigration offices 
abroad, micromanaged immigrants’ entry to Canada.
Although the adoption of the point system was framed 
as a departure from previous racist policy, it demonstrated 
a new form of racism. It employed “cultural racism” where 
certain cultures that promoted Western liberal and indi-
vidualistic values were welcomed in Canada. “The cultures 
supposed implicitly superior,” notes Balibar, “are said to be 
the cultures whose ‘spirit of community’ is constituted by 
individualism.”60 As a result of the (somewhat relaxed) point 
system, the resettled Chileans who came to Canada were, as 
Andras commented, “young, well-educated and adaptable 
people who, with a little help, can be expected to add their 
contribution to the richness and variety of Canada.”61
Whereas the RCMP sought to eradicate communist and 
Quebec separatist threats, immigration and health officials 
were eager to screen and select for adaptable immigrants 
who would contribute to Canada’s economy and whose 
lives were at risk. These goals were not fully compatible with 
each other. The RCMP’s concerns with securing Canada’s 
political survival at times contradicted immigration offi-
cials’ humanitarian mission. Many Chileans who urgently 
needed immigration officials’ humanitarian intervention 
were exactly the refugees that the RCMP was screening out. 
This inherit contradiction was fundamental in glossing over 
the Canadian government’s aim of controlling the entry of 
Chileans.
Reassembling
Reassembling involves “grafting on new elements and 
reworking old ones” by employing new discourses to old 
ones and changing meanings and key terms.62 The assem-
blage of power created to control the Chilean refugees in 
this early period influenced the Canadian government’s 
responses and attitudes to other refugee crises abroad.
This crisis revealed the emergence of civil society as a 
powerful actor in challenging the practices of the govern-
ment in refugee crises abroad. Prior to this, civil society 
had very little influence on immigration and refugee poli-
cies and practices.63 Hanff asserts that the resettlement of 
the Chilean refugees marks a fundamental shift in the role 
that civil society plays in crucial foreign policy issues: “The 
Canadian government took this decision, not because its 
stability was threatened, but rather because the high profile 
of the activists and the visibility of the pressure threatened 
an image that Canadians and non-Canadians seem to have 
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about Canada. At its narrowest, this image could be defined 
in terms of Canada’s so-called refuge-thinking tradition. In 
its broadest context, it is defined in terms of Canada’s inter-
nationally responsible attitude.”64
For the first time, governing authorities needed to act-
ively engage with civil society in order to manage expecta-
tions, especially when refugees did not conform to the gov-
erning authorities’ desires. The growing role of civil society 
was reflected, for example, in the decision of the minister 
of manpower and immigration to conduct coast-to-coast 
public consultations on immigration issues in 1973. The 
assembled “partnership” between civil society groups and 
the government was framed as a humanitarian and non-
political response. Since then, refugee reception has been 
presented as a negotiated compromise, not as reflecting the 
sole vision of the government.
Further, in light of the Chilean and Ugandan-Asian 
resettlement, the government incorporated the “designated 
classes” provision into the 1976 Immigration Act. Canadian 
policy-makers believed that the Refugee Convention defin-
ition was not encompassing enough to include individuals 
who did not cross internationally recognized boundaries, 
and whose “collective situation placed them in a de facto 
refugee situation.”65 Under this category, persons who are 
able to successfully establish themselves in Canada are 
issued landed immigrant visas. “The sponsorship allocation 
statistics,” Hathaway writes, “give the impression of a lar-
ger Canadian contribution to the relief of the international 
refugee burden than is actually the case.”66 The number of 
“refugees” sponsored under this category is included in the 
annual refugee quota allocated by the government when 
many are not refugees at all.
Moreover, while the government insisted that this pro-
vision aimed to provide flexible tools in responding to 
humanitarian needs, Hathaway points out that this desig-
nated class reflects not only economic but also political con-
siderations.67 This issue was raised in a motion to amend the 
admissibility section 19(e) of the 1976 Immigration Act. The 
amendment sought to ensure that there is “no distinction 
among refugees, fleeing rightist or leftist persecution.”68 
The minister of employment and immigration rejected the 
amendment on the basis of security concerns:
It is difficult to see how most provisions respecting subversion and 
national security could be reconciled with the proposed amend-
ment. No political party is illegal in Canada, yet membership 
in a particular party abroad, where it is probably legal is often 
the principle evidence that a person is a security risk. With the 
amendment it would appear that the subversion/security provi-
sions could apply only in the case of an overt act defined as an 
offence in Canadian law. This would be going too far in the case of 
refugees. It would effectively prevent the screening out of people, 
although refugees by definition, who were forced to leave their 
countries of citizenship or residence because of their adherence to 
parties with extremist policies, which would be just as dangerous 
in Canada as elsewhere.69
The minister’s objection to the amendments proves that 
the security mechanisms enacted toward refugees are essen-
tial and justified, and intimately connected to the govern-
ment’s political goals.
Conclusion
The study aims to shed light on how the Canadian govern-
ment assembled its response to the Chilean refugee crisis 
in the first few months of the coup, and the conditions 
that made the Chilean refugee resettlement possible. It 
argues that despite the Canadian government’s humani-
tarian claims, fear and (in)security framed and defined its 
approach to refugee protection. Such fear and (in)security 
gave rise to a complex nexus of power that shaped the Chil-
ean refugee resettlement.
The study contributes to scholarly literature in three ways. 
First, it adds to a theory and methodology of practice in the 
field of refugee studies. It adopts the concept of apparatus/
assemblage to practice, and thus highlights the complexity 
involved in responding to refugee crises. By applying prac-
tices of assemblage, the article exposes how different forces 
and relations of power are assembled and reassembled to 
control the entry of refugees. It also shows how exclusion 
from protection is managed through the articulation and 
re-articulation of knowledge and power, and functions 
through the circulation of fear and anxiety. This under-
standing is pivotal in understanding how current refugee 
policies and practices are shaped.
Second, the article challenges the assumption that Can-
ada’s response to the Chilean refugees was influenced by 
the United States. My research found very little evidence 
to support this claim. Thus, the article contributes to new 
knowledge by emphasizing the Canadian government’s 
independence in managing its response to this crisis.
Third, the article highlights the strengths and limitations 
of civil society in challenging government practices. The 
limited success of civil society in this resettlement points 
to the power of the security apparatus in deciding which 
lives are worth living. Yet it also underlines the potential 
of civil society to resist this apparatus. Civil society capital-
ized on public spaces, such as universities and churches, 
and exposed knowledge that the government had tried 
to conceal; it was therefore able to galvanize support and 
challenge government practices. However, since the 1970s 
this public voice has been slowly institutionalized by being 
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made a partner in decision-making. Hence government 
practices toward refugees have been presented as a com-
promise between competing public interests.
Future studies could explore further the tension between 
Canadian civil society and the security apparatus that seeks 
to impose the vision and desires of Canadian governing 
authorities. The question must be asked: Does this partner-
ship hinder or facilitate refugee protection?
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